

Appendix for “WHO’S TO BLAME? POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION AND ELECTORAL PUNISHMENT UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM”

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This appendix contains additional analyses that are not reported fully in the main text.

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Table A1: **Summary Statistics: Dataset of Election Years in Russian Municipalities (2003-2012)**

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min, Max
UNITED RUSSIA VOTE SHARE (REGIONAL)	402	45.45	16.28	[12.93, 93.93]
POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION	396	0.29	0.45	[0, 1]
Δ UNEMPLOYMENT	367	-0.15	0.89	[-8.72, 3.63]
UNEMPLOYMENT	370	1.36	1.91	[0.17, 33.40]
PRESS FREEDOM	381	2.07	0.71	[1, 3]
WORKING POP.	335	64.32	3.05	[54.78, 74.62]
AVERAGE INCOME	390	9.45	4.72	[2.91, 30.55]
REGIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE	401	31.42	6.39	[16, 45]
BIRTH RATE	355	11.55	2.64	[4.7, 28.9]
UNITED RUSSIA MAYOR	344	0.58	0.49	[0, 1]
PERCENT RUSSIAN	383	0.80	0.22	[0.01, 0.97]
REPUBLIC STATUS	383	0.19	0.40	[0, 1]
CIVIL SOCIETY (1991-93)	381	2.80	0.75	[1, 4]
MAJOR CITY	383	0.17	0.15	[0, 0.63]
MAYOR'S MARGIN	264	0.39	0.26	[0, 0.95]
UNITED RUSSIA DUMA VOTE SHARE	516	49.96	17.32	[20.43, 99.61]

Note: Data on Russian mayoral appointments collected by ICSID; all economic data from *MultiStat*.

Table A2: **Supplementary Analysis: Elected Mayors Punished for Poor Local Economic Performance**

DEPENDENT VARIABLES: <i>mayoral elections, 2003-2011</i>	Incumbent Vote Share <i>% of vote</i>				Did Incumbent Retain Office? <i>dummy; 1 = yes</i>			
Δ UNEMPLOYMENT _{t-1} <i>difference from previous year</i>	-2.562 (8.673) .768				-0.066 (0.147) .655			
HIGH Δ UNEMPLOY _{t-1} <i>dummy; 1=upper $\frac{1}{3}$</i>		-16.363 (7.519) .031				-0.319 (0.148) .034		
UNEMPLOYMENT _{t-1} <i>unemployment rates, in levels</i>			-8.764 (7.078) .218				-0.286 (0.151) .060	
HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT _{t-1} <i>dummy; 1=upper $\frac{1}{3}$</i>				-22.289 (8.862) .013				-0.415 (0.165) .013
REG. POL. CLIMATE <i>higher = more democratic</i>	1.085 (1.395) .438	0.577 (1.377) .676	1.322 (1.391) .343	0.406 (1.429) .777	0.032 (0.027) .231	0.022 (0.026) .390	0.037 (0.026) .163	0.019 (0.027) .479
PRESS FREEDOM <i>ord. ; 1=not free, 3=free</i>	-4.459 (8.417) .597	-4.636 (8.279) .577	-4.450 (8.277) .592	-3.114 (8.028) .699	-0.149 (0.174) .393	-0.152 (0.168) .367	-0.170 (0.172) .325	-0.126 (0.168) .452
WORKING POP. <i>working age as % of pop.</i>	-1.747 (6.780) .797	-2.653 (6.688) .692	0.039 (6.572) .995	1.675 (6.361) .793	-0.055 (0.126) .665	-0.072 (0.124) .562	-0.029 (0.116) .801	0.003 (0.116) .980
AVERAGE INCOME <i>1000s of constant rubles</i>	-0.494 (3.397) .885	-0.514 (3.125) .870	-1.361 (3.364) .687	-2.806 (3.407) .412	-0.076 (0.066) .249	-0.076 (0.062) .225	-0.113 (0.064) .080	-0.120 (0.064) .063
MAJOR CITY <i>city as % of region pop</i>	9.377 (5.425) .086	10.442 (5.228) .048	9.680 (5.811) .098	9.329 (5.746) .107	0.293 (0.119) .016	0.317 (0.111) .005	0.312 (0.125) .014	0.298 (0.123) .017
BIRTH RATE <i>births per 1000 residents</i>	5.053 (5.503) .360	3.236 (5.595) .564	5.322 (4.875) .277	5.487 (4.749) .250	0.130 (0.095) .175	0.093 (0.100) .355	0.158 (0.085) .066	0.138 (0.084) .103
UR MAYOR <i>dummy; 1 = UR member</i>	2.402 (9.260) .796	3.702 (8.977) .681	-0.503 (8.676) .954	-5.837 (8.867) .512	0.113 (0.195) .565	0.133 (0.189) .483	0.020 (0.168) .907	-0.048 (0.177) .785
PAST MARGIN <i>previous margin of victory</i>	-10.389 (15.611) .507	-9.816 (15.829) .536	-11.012 (17.560) .532	-16.108 (17.210) .351	-0.091 (0.275) .742	-0.076 (0.271) .781	-0.185 (0.298) .535	-0.206 (0.288) .476
<i>Number of Observations</i>	180	180	184	184	180	180	184	184
<i>City Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Year Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Data on Russian mayoral appointments collected by ICSID; all economic data from *MultiStat*. The first four columns report OLS coefficient estimates modeling incumbent vote share in a given mayoral election; the remaining columns report OLS estimates from linear probability models of incumbent reelection. Parameter estimates for fixed effects and model constants not presented in table to save space. City-clustered standard errors in parentheses; p-values appear below standard errors.

Table A3: **Robustness Check: Controlling for Past Electoral Performance & Time-Invariant Controls**

DV: UNITED RUSSIA VOTE SHARE				
<i>% of vote in regional legislative elections</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION	1.580	1.562	0.306	1.415
<i>dummy; 1 = appointed mayor</i>	(1.848)	(1.827)	(1.738)	(1.478)
	.394	.394	.861	.339
Δ UNEMPLOYMENT	0.085	0.347	1.299	0.829
<i>difference from previous year</i>	(0.681)	(0.561)	(0.690)	(0.479)
	.901	.538	.062	.083
CENTRALIZATION	-2.491	-2.343	-2.542	-3.702
× Δ UNEMPLOYMENT	(1.003)	(1.025)	(1.445)	(1.269)
	.014	.024	.081	.004
PAST VOTE SHARE	0.432	0.365	0.242	
<i>lagged dependent variable</i>	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.067)	
	<.0001	<.0001	.0004	
PERCENT RUSSIAN			-21.706	-10.002
<i>ethnic Russians as % of regional pop.</i>			(6.708)	(4.917)
			.002	.042
MAJOR CITY			-11.000	-20.029
<i>city pop. as % of regional pop.</i>			(5.765)	(4.793)
			.059	<.0001
STRENGTH OF CIVIL SOCIETY (1991-93)			0.639	5.001
<i>ordinal; min=1, max=4</i>			(1.896)	(1.322)
			.737	.0002
<i>Number of Observations</i>	177	152	151	321
<i>Includes Standard Controls</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Year Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>City Effects</i>	No	No	No	Random Effects

Note: Data on Russian mayoral appointments collected by ICSID; all economic data from *MultiStat*. Column 4 includes random effects for city. Parameter estimates for standard control variables press freedom, regional political climate, working age population, average income, birth rate, year fixed effects and model constants not presented in table to save space; available upon request. City-clustered standard errors in parentheses; p-values appear below standard errors.

Table A4: **Robustness Check: Controlling for Concurrent Duma Elections & Local Political Machines**

DV: UNITED RUSSIA VOTE SHARE <i>% of vote in regional legislative elections</i>	$\Delta Unemployment$		<i>Unemployment</i> <i>(levels)</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION <i>dummy; 1 = appointed mayor</i>	0.133 (2.058) .948	2.627 (2.196) .233	9.004 (3.189) .005	11.905 (3.341) .0005
UNEMPLOYMENT <i>measure varies by column</i>	1.631 (0.555) .004	1.418 (0.483) .004	0.062 (1.321) .963	-0.279 (1.230) .821
CENTRALIZATION × UNEMPLOYMENT	-4.484 (1.288) .001	-4.394 (1.145) .0002	-6.170 (2.043) .003	-6.187 (2.012) .002
PRESS FREEDOM <i>ordinal; 1 = not free, 3 = somewhat free</i>	0.992 (1.349) .463	1.221 (1.300) .349	0.220 (1.391) .875	0.309 (1.300) .812
REGIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE <i>continuous; higher = more democratic</i>	-0.476 (0.315) .133	-0.513 (0.357) .153	-0.518 (0.330) .118	-0.572 (0.376) .130
WORKING POPULATION <i>working age pop. as % of total pop.</i>	0.948 (0.542) .082	1.806 (0.915) .050	0.697 (0.549) .206	1.502 (0.884) .091
AVERAGE INCOME <i>in constant rubles</i>	-1.731 (0.748) .022	-1.456 (0.767) .059	-1.759 (0.740) .018	-1.465 (0.741) .050
BIRTH RATE <i>births per 1000 residents</i>	-3.041 (1.047) .004	-2.996 (1.071) .006	-3.021 (1.046) .004	-2.926 (1.049) .006
CONCURRENT ELECTION <i>dummy; 1 = region & Duma at same time</i>	-1.444 (3.423) .674		-1.252 (3.220) .698	
LOCAL POLITICAL MACHINE <i>margin of victory for last elected mayor</i>		7.572 (3.727) .044		9.122 (3.773) .017
<i>Number of Observations</i>	322	310	325	313
<i>City Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Year Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Data on Russian mayoral appointments collected by ICSID; all economic data from *MultiStat*. Parameter estimates for fixed effects and model constants not presented in table to save space. City-clustered standard errors in parentheses; p-values appear below standard errors.

Table A5: **Robustness Check: Controlling for Change in Mayors' Partisanship**

DV: UNITED RUSSIA VOTE SHARE		
<i>% of vote in regional legislative elections</i>	(1)	(2)
POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION	3.486	4.220
<i>dummy; 1 = appointed mayor</i>	(2.985)	(2.983)
	.244	.159
Δ UNEMPLOYMENT	1.776	1.335
<i>difference from previous year</i>	(0.591)	(0.635)
	.003	.037
CENTRALIZATION	-3.855	-3.558
× Δ UNEMPLOYMENT	(1.232)	(1.203)
	.002	.004
PRESS FREEDOM	1.687	1.473
<i>ordinal; 1 = not free, 3 = somewhat free</i>	(1.645)	(1.658)
	.306	.376
REGIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE	-1.087	-0.983
<i>continuous; higher = more democratic</i>	(0.425)	(0.429)
	.011	.023
WORKING POPULATION	1.083	1.050
<i>working age pop. as % of total pop.</i>	(1.026)	(1.024)
	.293	.307
AVERAGE INCOME	-2.341	-2.452
<i>in constant rubles</i>	(1.028)	(1.042)
	.024	.020
BIRTH RATE	-2.911	-2.969
<i>births per 1000 residents</i>	(1.375)	(1.366)
	.036	.031
PARTISANSHIP CHANGE	0.892	2.116
<i>dummy; 1 = part. of mayor differs from previous year</i>	(2.528)	(2.691)
	.725	.433
PARTISANSHIP CHANGE		9.275
× Δ UNEMPLOYMENT		(4.469)
		.039
<i>Number of Observations</i>	250	250
<i>City Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes
<i>Year Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes

Note: Data on Russian mayoral appointments collected by ICSID; all economic data from *MultiStat*. Parameter estimates for fixed effects and model constants not presented in table to save space. City-clustered standard errors in parentheses; p-values appear below standard errors.

Table A6: **Robustness Check: Analyzing Within-Region Variation via Region Fixed Effects**

DV: UNITED RUSSIA VOTE SHARE <i>% of vote in regional legislative elections</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION <i>dummy; 1 = appointed mayor</i>	-1.134 (2.593)	-0.627 (2.462)	4.474 (3.427)	3.958 (3.181)
	.664	.800	.198	.220
Δ UNEMPLOYMENT <i>difference from previous year</i>	0.967 (0.720)	1.004 (0.534)		
	.186	.067		
CENTRALIZATION $\times \Delta$ UNEMPLOYMENT	-2.435 (0.996)	-2.088 (1.088)		
	.019	.061		
UNEMPLOYMENT <i>reg. unemployed as % of working age pop.</i>			-0.305 (0.846)	-1.365 (0.662)
			.720	.045
CENTRALIZATION \times UNEMPLOYMENT			-3.583 (1.491)	-2.866 (1.274)
			.020	.029
WORKING POPULATION <i>working age pop. as % of total pop.</i>		-0.006 (0.388)		0.017 (0.398)
		.987		.965
AVERAGE INCOME <i>in constant rubles</i>		0.164 (0.290)		0.087 (0.312)
		.574		.782
BIRTH RATE <i>births per 1000 residents</i>		-1.080 (0.596)		-0.758 (0.551)
		.077		.176
ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE <i>city employment as % of regional employment</i>		-17.885 (6.936)		-22.220 (6.993)
		.013		.003
<i>Number of Observations</i>	288	267	291	269
<i>Year Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Region Effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Data on Russian mayoral appointments collected by ICSID; all economic data from *MultiStat*. To analyze within-region variation, analyses conducted on subset of regions with more than one city in the dataset. Parameter estimates for fixed effects and model constants not presented in table to save space. Region-clustered standard errors in parentheses; p-values appear below standard errors.

Table A7: **Robustness Check: Controlling for Region Unemployment Trends**

DV: UNITED RUSSIA VOTE SHARE <i>% of vote in regional legislative elections</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION <i>dummy; 1 = appointed mayor</i>	7.585 (3.114) .016	8.328 (3.225) .011	0.181 (2.225) .935	0.457 (2.105) .829
UNEMPLOYMENT <i>reg. unemployed as % of working age pop.</i>	0.550 (1.000) .583	0.331 (1.216) .786		
CENTRALIZATION × UNEMPLOYMENT	-5.269 (1.951) .008	-5.672 (2.094) .007		
REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT <i>reg. unemployed as % of working age pop.</i>	-0.782 (0.437) .075	-0.603 (0.463) .195		
ΔUNEMPLOYMENT <i>difference from previous year</i>			0.910 (0.613) .140	1.638 (0.549) .003
CENTRALIZATION × ΔUNEMPLOYMENT			-4.075 (1.642) .014	-4.895 (1.333) .0003
ΔREGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT <i>difference from previous year</i>			0.448 (0.506) .376	0.686 (0.511) 0.181
<i>Number of Observations</i>	366	325	363	322
<i>Includes Standard Controls</i>	No	Yes	No	Yes
<i>Year Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>City Effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Data on Russian mayoral appointments collected by ICSID; all economic data from *MultiStat*. Parameter estimates for standard control variables press freedom, regional political climate, working age population, average income, birth rate, city fixed effects, year fixed effects and model constants not presented in table to save space; available upon request. City-clustered standard errors in parentheses; p-values appear below standard errors.

Table A8: **Alternate Dependent Variable: United Russia's Margin of Victory**

DV: UNITED RUSSIA ELECTORAL MARGIN				
<i>% above second largest party in reg. legislative elec.</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION <i>dummy; 1 = appointed mayor</i>	-0.027 (0.032) .409	-0.026 (0.030) .386	0.073 (0.051) .159	0.074 (0.048) .122
Δ UNEMPLOYMENT <i>difference from previous year</i>	0.009 (0.008) .267	0.019 (0.008) .023		
CENTRALIZATION $\times \Delta$ UNEMPLOYMENT	-0.063 (0.032) .052	-0.056 (0.027) .038		
UNEMPLOYMENT <i>registered unemployed as % of working age pop.</i>			-0.022 (0.017) .203	-0.014 (0.021) .526
CENTRALIZATION \times UNEMPLOYMENT			-0.074 (0.036) .038	-0.072 (0.033) .029
PRESS FREEDOM <i>ordinal; 1 = not free, 3 = somewhat free</i>		0.028 (0.021) .183		0.012 (0.022) .594
REGIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE <i>continuous; higher = more democratic</i>		0.003 (0.005) .526		0.002 (0.005) .772
WORKING POPULATION <i>working age pop. as % of total pop.</i>		0.008 (0.009) .372		0.003 (0.009) .689
AVERAGE INCOME <i>in constant rubles</i>		-0.014 (0.011) .216		-0.015 (0.011) .181
BIRTH RATE <i>births per 1000 residents</i>		-0.042 (0.019) .029		-0.041 (0.019) .031
<i>Number of Observations</i>	330	305	333	308
<i>City Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Year Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Data on Russian mayoral appointments collected by ICSID; all economic data from *MultiStat*. Parameter estimates for fixed effects and model constants not presented in table to save space. City-clustered standard errors in parentheses; p-values appear below standard errors.

Table A9: **Additional Analysis: Blame Attribution & Presidential Election Results**

DV: PUTIN/MEDVEDEV VOTE SHARE <i>% of vote in Presidential elections (2004 & 2008)</i>	(1)	(2)
POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION <i>dummy; 1 = appointed mayor</i>	3.668 (3.539) .301	3.179 (3.787) .402
Δ UNEMPLOYMENT <i>difference from previous year</i>	-0.717 (1.812) .693	
CENTRALIZATION $\times \Delta$ UNEMPLOYMENT	0.795 (1.796) .658	
UNEMPLOYMENT <i>registered unemployed/working age pop.</i>		-0.624 (0.482) .197
CENTRALIZATION \times UNEMPLOYMENT		0.860 (0.609) .160
PRESS FREEDOM <i>ordinal; 1 = not free, 3 = somewhat free</i>	0.116 (0.937) .902	0.398 (0.953) .677
REGIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE <i>continuous; higher = more democratic</i>	-0.469 (0.311) .134	-0.459 (0.301) .129
WORKING POPULATION <i>working age pop./total pop.</i>	-0.859 (0.348) .015	-0.811 (0.310) .010
AVERAGE INCOME <i>in constant rubles</i>	0.270 (0.939) .774	0.425 (0.930) .649
BIRTH RATE <i>births per 1000 residents</i>	1.789 (0.965) .065	1.682 (1.016) .100
<i>Number of Observations</i>	249	253
<i>City Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes
<i>Year Fixed Effects</i>	Yes	Yes

Note: Data on Russian mayoral appointments collected by ICSID; all economic data from *MultiStat*. Parameter estimates for fixed effects and model constants not presented in table to save space. City-clustered standard errors in parentheses; p-values appear below standard errors.

Table A10: **Sensitivity Analysis: Marginal Effects Estimates of Increasing Unemployment in Appointment Cities, Depending on Assumptions about Unobserved Confounders**

δ	γ					
	0.5	1	2	3	5	10
0.1	-2.94	-2.89	-2.79	-2.69	-2.49	-1.99
0.3	-2.84	-2.69	-2.39	-2.09	-1.49	0.01
0.5	-2.74	-2.49	-1.99	-1.49	-0.49	2.01

γ = the effect size of some latent factor(s) U on UR vote share.
 δ = the difference in prevalence of U in appointment vs. election cities.

Discussion

In addition to the robustness checks and placebo tests described in this main text, sensitivity analyses represent a complementary tool for the robustness of established results to potential bias arising from unobserved factors. As opposed to ruling out inferential threats, sensitivity analyses help to clarify and quantify just how pernicious latent differences would need to be in order to overturn a given result.

We follow the method described in VanderWeele (2011) and investigate our results' sensitivity to unobserved confounders with varying combinations of two traits. First, we vary assumptions about the size of the latent factors' effect on UR vote share (γ). Independently, we also vary assumptions about the difference in the prevalence of these latent factors within election versus appointment cities (δ).

Here, this analysis assesses the sensitivity of the estimated marginal effects of increasing unemployment on UR's regional vote share, conditional on political centralization. Based on the estimates from Table 1, the paper reports that in cities with an appointed mayor, United Russia is estimated to lose on average an additional 3% of total votes for each percentage point that local unemployment rates are higher than the previous year's ($\frac{\partial y}{\partial x} = -2.99$).

In order to reduce these marginal effects to zero, the results above indicate that unmodeled confounders would need to be both highly correlated with UR regional vote share ($\gamma > 5$ – a magnitude comparable to the estimated effects of increasing a city's average salary by more than 50%) and overwhelmingly more prevalent in cities that end up with appointed mayors compared to those that retain elected mayors (i.e., $\delta = 0.5$ is consistent with the factor being present in 90% of appointed cities vs. 40% of elected cities). The improbability that such important and distinct differences across cities would go unnoticed strengthens our confidence in the results.

Figure A1: Adoption of Mayoral Appointments Over Time






Figure A2: Marginal Effects of Mayoral Appointment on United Russia's Vote Share, Conditional on Changes in Unemployment




Note: Based on coefficient estimates in Table 1 in the main paper. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A3: Marginal Effects of Increasing Unemployment Levels on United Russia's Vote Share, Conditional on Mayoral Appointments



Note: Based on coefficient estimates in Table 1 in the main paper. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals. $n_{\text{elected}} = 268$; $n_{\text{appointed}} = 96$.

Figure A4: **Balance Tests: Before Reforms, Non-Appointment & Pre-Appointment Cities Similar on Most Observable Characteristics**



Note: The p-values refer to two-tailed hypothesis tests comparing difference of means between non-appointment and pre-appointment cities on each of the presented variables. The null hypothesis is no difference.

As Figure A4 shows, we find minor, but statistically significant differences for only a select few indicators. On average, pre-appointment cities tend to: have larger working age populations (65.4% vs. 63.9%) and be located in ethnic republics (19% vs. 8%). At the 0.10 significance level, we see, on average, pre-appointment cities tend to have fewer births per 1000 persons (10.8 vs. 11.4). These differences are substantively small, and we see no obvious theoretical explanations for how these minor demographic differences would indirectly generate the conditional relationship we observe in the data.

Description of Aggregating District-Level Electoral Results to City-Level Data

One of our key independent variables is United Russias vote share in cities during regional and federal elections. Unfortunately, the raw data released by the Central Election Commission is not (usually) aggregated at the level of the city. The highest level of aggregation available from the CEC is the Territorial Election Commission (Territorialnaya Elektoralnaya Kommissia or TIK, hereafter). Each TIK contains between 10 and 362 precincts (the median was 44 in the 2011 Duma elections). TIKs usually, but not always, correspond roughly to municipal districts (*munitsipal'niye okruga*) and city districts (*gorodskiye okruga*). For smaller cities – i.e. those with populations less than 150,000 there is only one TIK per city. The task of calculating United Russias vote share at the city level is straightforward for these cities. For larger cities, however, there are multiple TIKs per city.

In order to calculate the the share of the vote for United Russia in cities with multiple TIKs, we (and our research assistants) identified the TIKs that were located in each large cities. We then summed the number of votes for UR across theses TIKS and divided it by the number of valid ballots. For most large cities, it is straightforward to identify the TIKs that are located in each city because they are assigned names that identify them as part of the city. For example, the seven TIKs located in Chelyabinsk for the 2007 State Duma elections were called: Cheljabinsk, Central'naja, Cheljabinsk, Kalininskaja, Cheljabinsk, Kurchatovskaja, Cheljabinsk, Leninskaja, Cheljabinsk, Metallurgicheskaja, Cheljabinsk, Sovetskaja, and Cheljabinsk, Traktorozavodskaja.

For a handful of cities, however, the names of TIKs are not so easily associated with a particular city. For example in the regional elections in Volgogradskaya Oblast in 2003 the TIKs associated with Volgograd city were named: Traktorzavodkaya, Krasnoktyabrskii, Dzerzhinski, Voroshilovskaya, Tsentralnaya, Kirovskaya, Sovetskaya, and Krasnoarmeiskaya. In those cities where the names of TIKs are not obviously associated with a given city, we consulted the archived websites of regional election commissions (using web.archive.org) and regional media sources.